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dopted  by  the  European  Commission  in 
July  2011,  the  proposed  Capital 
Requirements  Directive  and  Regulation 
(CRD IV-CRR) translate into EU law the Basel III 
standards  adopted  by  the  Basel  Committee  for 
Banking Supervision (BCBS).1 Among other things, 
the proposal increases the quality and quantity of 
the  minimum  capital;  introduces  new  rules  on 
liquidity,  leverage  ratios,  counter-cyclical  buffers 
and  systemically  important  financial  institutions; 
and amends the definitions of counterparty credit 
risk  and  rules  for  the  banking  book.  The  rules 
complement  the  earlier  amendments  that 
strengthened  the  capital  and  disclosure 
requirements  for  the  trading  book  and  re-
securitization instruments as well as requirements 
to ensure that remuneration policies do not lead to 
excessive risk-taking. 
Most  European  banks  have  resisted  the 
implementation  of  the  new  round  of  reforms, 
noting that the stricter capital requirements would 
lead  to  a  significant  de-leveraging,  causing  a 
contraction of credit to the private sector and thus 
hurting  growth.  In  turn,  many  academics  and 
independent  experts  argue  that  the  hike  in 
minimum  capital  requirements  will  have  little 
impact  on  lending  levels. Indeed,  recent  research 
shows  that  large  banks  will  be  able  to  meet  the 
stricter requirements without significant hardship, 
                                                   
1  The  CRD  IV  proposal  comprises  a  Directive 
(COM(2011) 453 final) and a Regulation (COM(2011) 452 
final), both published on 20 July 2011.  
in many cases simply by retaining their earnings, 
engaging  in  debt-equity  swaps  or  re-adjusting 
internal models to reduce the capital charges.  
Other  observers  claim  that  the  CRD  IV-CRR 
proposal  has  been  watered  down,  mainly  to 
appease  the  private  interests  of  financial 
institutions  and  the  banking  industry  within 
Europe. Although some of these concerns may be 
exaggerated, it is true that the proposal is less far-
reaching than the Basel III Accord itself, effectively 
stopping  short  of  introducing  (or  committing  to 
introduce) binding rules for the leverage ratio and 
the long-term liquidity requirements.  
Many key details have been partially addressed or 
simply  postponed,  to  be  resolved  over  long 
transition  periods,  lasting  up  until  2018,  inviting 
the  risk  of  losing  the  political  momentum  to 
strengthen banking regulation. Moreover, some of 
the emerging regulatory concerns have been at best 
indirectly  addressed,  including  macro-prudential 
and  systemic  issues,  links  with  the  crisis-
management framework and the challenges arising 
from the shadow banking sector. 
As  such,  the  proposal  leaves  a  large  margin  of 
manoeuvre  to  the  European  Parliament  and  the 
Council to either strengthen or to further loosen the 
banking rules in Europe.2  
                                                   
2 Annex 1 summarizes the key policy discussions in the 
‘trialogue’  taking  place  between  the  European 
Commission, Parliament and Council during 2012.   
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All and all, the CRD IV-CRR proposal should not 
be seen as an end in itself but rather as a part of the 
EU’s broader regulatory response to the financial 
crisis.  
This Policy Brief provides a preliminary diagnosis 
of  the  proposed  regulatory  reforms  under  the 
proposal  and  suggests  avenues  for  improvement 
that would address some of these concerns.   
The  main  criticism  is  that  the  proposal  is  not 
ambitious enough. In some crucial areas, such as 
the  leverage  ratio  and  the  long-term  liquidity 
requirements  adopted  under  the  Basel  III 
framework, the CRD IV-CRR proposal stops short 
of  making  a  strict  commitment  to  introduce 
binding  requirements  and  instead  is  contented 
with  weaker  (and  possibly  divergent)  disclosure 
requirements.  
Minimum capital requirements 
The recent financial crisis has amply demonstrated 
that existing capital cushions are far from adequate 
to absorb losses or prevent widespread panics. Up 
until the moment the troubles emerged, many of 
the  failed  or  rescued  banks  were  in  compliance 
with the minimum capital requirements. The brunt 
of the criticism has been the increased reliance on 
lower  quality  capital,  especially  the  non-tangible 
equity and hybrid instruments, which may not be 
sufficient to absorb losses as a bank continues to 
operate,  (Blundell-Wignall  &  Atkinson,  2010; 
Viñals et al., 2010).  
 
The loss-absorption capacity of regulatory capital 
has been one of the central innovations of the Basel 
III framework and the CRD IV-CRR proposal. The 
proposed changes aim to ensure that the strictest 
definition  of  regulatory  capital  (i.e.  the  Tier-1 
capital) is truly loss-absorbing and can support a 
bank to operate as a going concern. In the case of 
some  of  the  hybrid  convertible  instruments  that 
have been accepted as Tier 1 capital under Basel II 
and  its  European  variant,  conversion  to  equity 
required a failure event to occur. However, rescues 
by  national  authorities  meant  that  such  an  event 
never took place, calling into question the effective 
loss-absorption of such instruments. 
The  Basel  Committee  on  Banking  Supervision 
(BCBS)  proposed  a  number  measures  under  the 
Basel  III  framework  to  strengthen  the  regulatory 
requirements  on  the  definition  of  capital.  In 
implementing these agreements, the CRD IV-CRR 
proposal  aims  at  harmonizing  the  definition  of 
capital within the EU while voluntarily opting for 
some  divergences  from  the  original  Basel 
framework.  In  line  with  the  Basel  III  rules,  the 
common equity Tier 1 capital is defined as the most 
junior  and  restrictive  form  of  regulatory  capital, 
entering into force in 2013 and onwards.3  
Additional  Tier  1  instruments  are  composed  of 
equity-like  instruments  that  can  absorb  losses 
when  the  entity  remains  solvent  (i.e.  ‘going-
concern  capital’),  leaving  some  of  the  less  loss-
absorbing  convertible  instruments  to  Tier  2  (i.e. 
‘gone-concern  capital’).  The  new  rules  also 
eliminate  the  use  of  Tier  3  capital  instruments, 
which were first introduced under Basel II to cover 
market risks.  
Although  the  Regulation  provides  the  general 
criteria  for  qualifying  instruments,  many  details 
are left to be ironed out by the European Banking 
Authority  (EBA).  If  national  authorities  can 
challenge EBA for political reasons, a race-to-the-
bottom  may  ensue.  Recent  evidence  shows  that 
such concerns are well-founded.  
 
Under its 2011 stress tests, the European Banking 
Authority  (EBA)  originally  suggested  that 
government  capital  support  measures  can  count 
                                                   
3 The common equity Tier 1 is comprised of equity that 
is paid-up, perpetual, not repayable with the exception 
of  liquidation,  excluding  preferential  shares,  with 
distributions  that  are  payable  after  all  obligations  are 
met, taking the first and largest share of losses, entitling 
owners to residual assets, with the paid-in amount not 
secured by any arrangement to enhance the seniority of 
the claim (Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR), Art. 
26(1)). In addition, a number of prudential adjustments 
and  deductions  are  made,  including  intangible  assets 
and goodwill, deferred tax assets on future tax-related 
earnings, expected loss amounts for institutions that use 
the internal-risk basis (IRB) approach, minority interests 
and own- or cross-holdings of own common equity Tier 
1 instruments (to avoid double counting) (CRR, Arts. 29-
43).  
If  national  authorities  can  challenge  EBA 
for political reasons, a race-to-the-bottom 
may ensue. 
Many of the failed or rescued banks were in 
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requirements. IMPLEMENTING BASEL III IN EUROPE | 3 
 
towards the strictest form of regulatory capital (i.e. 
core Tier 1 capital) only if they satisfy the general 
requirements applicable to all forms of equity. This 
would  imply  that  the  convertible  instruments 
widely used by German authorities to recapitalize 
the banks would fail to qualify. By the summer of 
2011,  the  suggested  treatment  by  EBA  received 
extensive criticism from both regional and federal 
authorities in Germany, including most notably the 
banking  regulator  (BaFIN).  Following  wide 
disagreements,  EBA  included  the  convertible 
instruments in the definition of capital, effectively 
introducing a distinction between the treatment of 
publicly- and privately-held capital instruments.  
For the moment, the CRD IV-CRR proposal leaves 
some areas regarding the definition of qualifying 
instruments  ambiguous.  For  example,  it  is  not 
entirely  clear  whether  the  EBA  will  have  the 
mandate  to  develop  definitions  for  all  or  only  a 
subset of the qualifying instruments. The European 
Parliament’s compromise of May 2012 requires the 
EBA to have a say on a series of broad concepts, 
including  most  notably  what  ‘first-loss  absorbing 
equity’  may  mean.  However,  the  Council’s 
compromise  appears  to  do  the  opposite,  leaving 
the  definition  and  monitoring  of  qualifying 
instruments to national authorities.  
To  avoid  increasing  the  discretion  between 
competent authorities, we argue that EBA should 
be much more than a bookkeeper of definitions or 
an issuer of non-binding guidelines. It should be 
armed with adequate powers to reach its primary 
aims  of  safeguarding  the  stability  of  the  EU’s 
banking  system,  ensuring  transparency  and 
protecting consumers’ rights. The current proposal 
allows  EBA  to  produce  a  list  on  the  forms  of 
instruments qualifying as common equity Tier 1 by 
January  2013.4  To  avoid  similar  challenges,  EBA 
should  be  given  the  ultimate  responsibility  to 
update  the  list  regularly  to  account  for  changing 
conditions. Moreover, similar lists should also be 
constructed  for  other  forms  of  regulatory  capital, 
i.e.  additional  Tier-1  and  Tier-2.  Most  crucially, 
however,  the  list  should  not  be  published  as  a 
general  guidance  and  should  be  binding  for  all 
member states. 
                                                   
4  Under  the  CRD  IV  proposal,  EBA  is  required  to 
publish a list of the “forms of capital instruments in each 
member  state  that  qualify  as  Common  Equity  Tier  1 
instruments” (CRR, Art. 25(4)). 
 
More  specifically,  EBA  should  be  required  to 
publish  and  maintain  ‘regulatory  technical 
standards’  on  the  qualifying  instruments,  which 
should  be  implemented  through  an  EU-wide 
regulation  (or  part  thereof),  effectively  reducing 
the flexibility granted to certain individual member 
states. 
Moving beyond the definition of regulatory capital, 
the EU rules envisage incremental strengthening of 
the  minimum  requirements.  For  the  common 
equity  Tier  1  ratio,  the  minimum  would  start  at 
3.5% of risk-weighted assets in 2013, raised to 4.0% 
in 2014 and 4.5% in 2015 and onwards. Likewise, 
minimum  Tier  1  capital  requirements  would 
commence  at  4.5%  in  2013,  increasingly 
incrementally  to  5.5%  in  2014  and  6.0%  starting 
with 2015 and onwards. Total capital requirements 
will remain at 8.0% for the entire period.5  
A central issue behind the increase of quality and 
quantity  of  capital  is  the  extent  to  which  the 
imposed capital requirements are a real cost either 
to  banks  or  to  the  society  generally.    It  is  often 
claimed,  mainly  by  the  banking  industry,  that 
imposing higher capital requirements would lead 
to  a  rise  in  the  costs  of  banking  and  financial 
intermediation  services,  lower  bank  lending,  and 
lower rates of return on equity and hence returns 
to shareholders.  
Research  shows  that  large  banks  will  be  able  to 
meet the stricter requirements without significant 
pains,  in  many  cases  simply  by  retaining  their 
earnings  (Ötker-Robe  &  Pazarbaşıoğlu,  2010). 
BCBS’s own impact assessments also confirm that 
the impact of the reinforced capital and  liquidity 
requirements would have a very limited impact on 
growth (BCBS, 2010a; b).  
The  response  of  the  EU’s  top  banks  to  EBA’s 
September 2011 capital exercise, which calls for a 
minimum  capital  requirement  of  9%  core  Tier  1 
capital  ratio  by  June  2012,  could  prove  to  be  a 
litmus test on whether tougher requirements lead 
to  deleveraging.  EBA’s  own  assessment  of  the 
plans  submitted  by  the  banks  reveals  that 
                                                   
5 The competent authorities are allowed to set limits that 
are closer to the post-2015 minimum restrictions within 
the transition period (CRR, Art. 448). 
EBA  should  be  much  more  than  a 
bookkeeper  of  definitions  or  an  issuer  of 
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deleveraging  would  be  very  limited  (EBA,  2012). 
However,  the  IMF’s  April  2012  Global  Financial 
Stability Report warns that the actual shedding of 
assets may be larger than foreseen by EBA due to 
broader  range  of  assumptions  on  structural  and 
cyclical factors (IMF, 2012). Whatever the ultimate 
impact  of  stronger  capital  requirements  may  be, 
both  analyses  find  that  most  of  the  deleveraging 
will involve asset sales and not lower issuance of 
credit. 
 
Recent  evidence  provided  in  Ayadi  et  al.  (2012) 
and the calibration of regulatory minimum capital 
requirements provided in BCBS (2010d) show that 
the minimum common equity Tier 1 ratio of 4.5% is 
a reasonable starting point but not necessarily high 
enough  to  prevent  widespread  failures  during 
downturns  and  in  the  more  interconnected  bank 
business models.  
Figure 1. Return on RWA (1st percentile estimates) 
 
Notes:  The  graph  shows  the  Harrell-Davis  lower  percentile 
estimates  for  the  distribution  of  returns  on  risk-weighted 
assets  (RoRWA),  representing  the  worst  losses  that  banks 
would face in rare events. The estimates are drawn from the 
entire  sample  years  and  banks.  Loss  estimates  for  the  10th 
percentile  correspond  to  losses  that  would  materialize  in  a 
once-in-a-decade bad event, as opposed to losses in a once-in-
20-years (5th percentile) and once-in-a-century events. 
Source: Ayadi et al. (2012). 
Figure 1 shows that despite a substantial variation 
across business models, many banks would suffer 
greater  risk-adjusted  losses  than  4.5%.  For 
example,  a  once-in-a-century  stress  event  would 
lead  to  risk-adjusted  losses  of  5.4%  on  average, 
exceeding  the  minimum  common  equity  Tier  1 
(CET1) requirement of 4.5% and getting close to the 
minimum Tier 1 requirement of 6%. Moreover, the 
suggested  requirements  are  unlikely  to  be 
adequate  for  all  business  models  of  EU  banks. 
Thus, the proposed requirement is likely to be too 
lenient and substantially weaker than the historical 
losses  suffered  in  recent  years,  or  the  failure 
likelihoods envisioned under the IRB approach.  
 
We  argue  for  a  more  substantial  harmonization 
and increasing of minimum capital requirements as 
a  major  tool  to  achieve  both  micro-  and  macro-
prudential aims.  Our recommendation is based in 
part on the proposition that many of the concerns 
about  raising  equity  capital  requirements  are 
unfounded  when  the  banks’  business  models  as 
well  as  systemic  and  long-term  perspectives  are 
considered.  
Risk-weighted assets 
Starting  with  Basel  II,  the  minimum  capital 
requirements  have  been  risk-sensitive,  implying 
that a bank would have to hold more capital the 
greater its risk exposures.6 Provided that they are 
measured correctly, the average risk weight, i.e. the 
ratio  of  RWA-to-total-assets,  should  ideally  be  a 
good indicator of its own portfolio risk if it reflects 
the true risk profile of the bank’s balance and off-
balance  sheet.  However,  there  is  concern  that 
regulatory arbitrage and politically driven policies 
have  called  into  question  the  appropriateness  of 
risk-sensitive regulations.  
The findings in Ayadi et al. (2011 and 2012) suggest 
that  regulatory  arbitrage  could  be  utilized 
extensively,  especially  by  investment  banks  that 
are  more  disposed  and  inclined  to  use  the 
sophisticated instruments to shed the risks off their 
                                                   
6 Contrasting recent calls, there is good reason to make 
capital  requirements  risk-sensitive.  Indeed,  faced  with 
purely linear (i.e. risk-insensitive) capital requirements, 
banks may shift their portfolios towards riskier assets, 
offsetting    their  losses  from  higher  capital  levels  by 
increasing their portfolio risks (Kahane, 1977; Koehn & 
Santomero, 1980; Kim & Santomero, 1988; Rochet, 1992). 
Empirical  studies  have  confirmed  that  fixed  capital 
requirements may increase risks, although the findings 
are far from unanimous, conditional on the size and the 
adequate capitalization of the bank (Furlong & Keeley, 
1989; Gennotte & Pyle, 1991; Calem & Rob, 1999). 
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balance  sheets.    More  specifically,  the  evidence 
shows  that  the  risk-weighted  asset  measure  is  a 
poor  indicator  of  underlying  risks.  In  particular, 
average  risk-weights  are  uncorrelated  or  even 
negatively  correlated  with  default  risks,  earnings 
volatility  and  capital  ratios.  These  findings  alone 
imply  that  the  risk-sensitive  approach  may  be 
seriously  biased  and  possibly  underestimate  the 
appropriate level of capital to be held.  
 
Other studies also suggest that regulatory arbitrage 
through  RWA-optimization  in the  banking  sector 
may be a serious threat (Acharya et al., 2010; Das & 
Sy, 2012). Many observers have also noted that the 
simplistic ‘single risk factor model’ underlining the 
IRB approach allows banks substantial freedom in 
minimizing  their  RWA  to  reduce  the  required 
capital  charges  (Calem  &  LaCour-Little,  2004; 
Blundell-Wignall  &  Atkinson,  2010).  More 
generally,  banks  may  use  the  risk-sensitive 
requirements  for  their  own  benefit  to  ‘optimize 
capital’ in a number of ways. 7  
 
The ability of larger banks to calculate their own 
risk charges through the internal rating-based (IRB) 
approach is most likely the principle reason behind 
the misalignment of the regulatory risk measures. 
Undoubtedly,  providing  flexibility  in  measuring 
regulatory capital, which represents a true cost for 
banks,  is  a  highly  accommodative  approach 
introduced  under  the  Basel  II  framework.  Banks 
have incentives to operate with minimum capital 
to satisfy the shareholders’ race for value creation, 
which in practice overlooks any micro-prudential 
or long-term stability considerations (Ayadi, 2012). 
Moreover,  supervisors  often  lack  the  necessary 
resources  to  verify  the  models  adequately. 
Regulators  have  also  contributed  to  ill-designed 
                                                   
7  In  his  seminal  article,  Jones (2000) discussed  several 
forms  of  “cosmetic”  adjustments  that  banks  can 
undertake  to  reduce  risk  weights,  including  the 
concentration of assets in highest risk classes for a given 
risk  weight,  various  forms  of  credit  enhancements, 
remote-origination and structured transactions. 
policies for political reasons. The risk weights used 
under the standardized approach, the alternative to 
the internal ratings (IRB) approach, have also been 
challenged on this account.  
In  particular,  the  risk  weights  show  a  highly 
preferential treatment of real estate and sovereign 
exposures.8  They  have  also  not  paid  sufficient 
attention to off-balance sheet risk exposures, most 
notably through securitization transactions.9 Much 
like  the  potential  loopholes  in  the  IRB  approach, 
these  practices  guide  banks  to  allocate  financial 
resources without paying due attention to the real 
risk profile.  Most of these concerns have not been 
addressed  under  the  CRD  IV-CRR  proposal;  in 
particular, the zero-risk weighting of EU sovereign 
debt remains to be applicable. 
Amendments  put  forward  by  the  European 
Parliament’s  Committee  on  Economic  and 
Monetary  Affairs  (ECON)  has  sought  to  address 
these  concerns  by  instigating  a  potential  re-
adjustment of the risk-weights. 10 Nevertheless, it is 
                                                   
8  Fundamental  misalignment  of  the  risk  weights 
continues to hold in the treatment of sovereign debt and 
other  exposures such  as  real  estate.  The CRD  IV-CRR 
proposal  continues  to  assign  a  zero-weight  to  all 
exposures  to  EU  member  states’  central  governments 
and central banks that are denominated and funded in 
the  domestic  currencies,  notwithstanding  the  credit 
ratings  for  the  relevant  securities.  More  crucially,  the 
standardized zero-weight is available as a default option 
even  for  institutions  using  the  IRB  approach  (i.e. 
“permanent  partial  use”),  effectively  providing  a 
flexibility  that  is  otherwise  not  generally  available  in 
other exposure classes.  
9  Under  the  CRD  IV-CRR  proposal,  only  the  risk-
weights  for  exposures  to  securitized  assets  are 
increased.  Rules  on  exposures  to  securitisation 
transactions  were  tightened  under  an  earlier 
amendment  (CRD  II),  requiring  originating  banks  to 
retain a “net economic interest” by holding on to at least 
5% of the nominal value of the securitized tranches sold 
or  transferred.    Although  some  suggest  a  further 
tightening of the “skin in the game” rules, it should not 
be forgotten that issuers may hedge the corresponding 
risks from retained parts and may thus offload the own 
risks  from  a  higher  retention  rate  (Dewatripont  et  al., 
2010).  
10 The amendment requires the Commission to “submit 
a to the European Parliament and the Council proposing 
options to adjust that risk weight accordingly as soon as 
possible,  while  taking  into  account  potentially 
destabilising  effects  of  tabling  such  proposals  during 
periods  of  market  stress”  (Amendment  for  a  draft 
Banks  may  use  the  risk-sensitive 
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uncertain  whether  the  review  process  will  be 
adopted in the final legislation. 
The CRD IV-CRR proposal also continues to treat 
retail  and  real  estate  exposures  in  a  preferential 
manner. In particular, exposures to natural persons 
or  small-  and  medium-sized  enterprises  (SMEs) 
continue  to  receive  lower  risk-weights  than 
unrated corporate exposures.11 In addition, secured 
mortgage exposures on real estate are awarded a 
lower  rating  than  higher-rated  corporate 
exposures.12  It  is  likely  that  the  risk  weights  will 
even be further reduced in the ultimate legislation, 
leading  to  a  greater  divergence  between  the  risk 
weights and the actual underlying risks.13  
The  heavy  reliance  on  external  credit  assessment 
institutions (ECAIs) as a basis for determining the 
risk  weights  under  the  standardized  approach  is 
yet another reason for concern on the reliability of 
the  risk  weights.  By  construction,  the  use  of 
                                                                                          
report, 16 April 2012, Recital 69b). The Council under 
the Danish presidency has not put forward comparable 
elements as of the writing of this report.  
11  The  CRD  IV-CRR  proposal assigns  a risk-weight of 
75% for all retail exposures to natural persons or SMEs, 
provided that the total amount owed does not exceed €1 
million (CRR, Art. 118). Meanwhile, unrated corporate 
exposures  continue  to  receive  a  risk-weight  of  100%. 
One  argument  for  lower  risk-weights  on  retail  loans 
would  be  the  ability  of  banks  to  mitigate  their  risks. 
Although the proposal requires the retail exposures to 
be adequately diversified (CRR, Art. 218(b)), there is no 
attempt to define what that desired level might be. This 
omission is unfortunate as one of the key lessons learnt 
from  the  subprime  crisis  (and  earlier  crises)  was  the 
need  for  heightened  monitoring  of  diversification  and 
the resulting systemic risks posed on the entire financial 
system (Hellwig, 2009).  
12 Under the CRD IV-CRR proposal, residential property 
exposures  that  are  “fully  and  completely  secured  by 
mortgages on residential property which is or shall be 
occupied” are assigned a risk-weight of 35% (CRR, Art. 
120). The  secured  exposures  to  commercial  real  estate 
are assigned a higher, 50% risk weight (CRR, Art. 121). 
In  comparison,  A-rated  corporate  exposures 
(corresponding to credit quality step 2, or A+/A/A- in 
Standard  &  Poor’s  terminology)  are  assigned  a  risk-
weight of 50% (CRR, Art. 117). 
13  Under  the  compromise  adopted  by  the  European 
Parliament’s  Committee  on  Economic  and  Monetary 
Affairs  (ECON)  on  14  May  2012,  the  risk  weights  for 
SME exposures were further dropped from the original 
proposed amount of 75% to 50%, while the total allowed 
exposure was expanded to €2 million. 
external  credit  ratings  delivers  partial  risk 
sensitivity because not all exposures are rated and 
ratings  do  not  necessarily  reflect  underlying  risk 
profiles. Unrated corporate exposures, for example, 
face the same risk charges as in the Basel I Accord. 
Therefore there is a strong expectation that banks 
with  highly  risky  unrated  exposures  would  be 
better  off  to  use  the  standardized  approach.  The 
perverse incentives could have been overcome by 
enhancing the incentives to broaden the range of 
rated products. However, the recent performance 
of  credit  rating  agencies  and  a  general  call  to 
reduce  reliance  on  external  ratings  make  such  a 
solution inapplicable.   
The  CRD  IV-CRR  proposal  continues  to  rely  on 
credit  ratings  with  some  minor  changes.  Among 
the amendments, new disclosure requirements for 
ECAIs are introduced, also contained in the Credit 
Rating Agencies Regulation (Regulation (EC) No. 
1060/2009). Under these requirements, the ECAIs 
are  to  publish  their  procedures,  methodologies, 
assumptions and key issues relating to the loss and 
cash-flow analysis. In addition, credit institutions 
are obliged to demonstrate due diligence in their 
securitization position, in that they should have a 
comprehensive and thorough understanding of the 
risks  and  not  rely  on  the  ECAI  ratings  before 
validating  the  underlying  assumptions,  models 
and  methodology.14  Apart  from  these  relatively 
minor  changes,  however,  the  EU  rules  do  not 
contain any direct attempt to reduce the reliance on 
ratings  by  credit  institutions  using  the 
standardized  approach  or  to  validate  the 
underlying methodology and assumptions.15  
                                                   
14 If competent authorities have evidence of any failure 
to  understand  the  underlying  risks  by  a  credit 
institution, they are required to impose a risk weight of 
no less than 250% (and less than 1,250%) on the relevant 
securitized product.  
15  Under  recently  proposed  technical  standards  to 
supplement  the  Credit  Rating  Agencies  Regulation 
(Regulation (EC) No. 1060/2009), credit rating agencies 
are required to submit to ESMA information regarding 
policies and information on the development, validation 
and review of their rating methodologies as well as the 
disclosure  of  the  credit  methodologies  and  key 
assumptions.  For  more  details,  see  Article  16  (and 
references therein) of ESMA’s Final Report on Regulatory 
technical  standards  on  the  information  for  registration  and 
certification  of  credit  rating  agencies,  22  December  2011 
(http://www.esma.europa.eu/system/files/2011_463.p
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We  argue  for  a  stricter  requirement  for  due 
diligence in the use of external ratings to cover a 
broader  range  of  exposure  classes.  In  that  sense, 
the  CRD  IV-CRR  proposal  can  require  a  credit 
institution  to  use  ECAI  credit  assessments 
provided that it can demonstrate that it took prior 
due  diligence  before  investing  to  validate  the 
relevant  assumptions  and  to  understand  the 
underlying  methodology  and  assumptions 
regarding  the  external  ratings.  In  addition,  the 
Regulation can enhance the Pillar 3 disclosure for 
investment  decisions  by  making  more  detailed 
disclosure  of  the  use  of  standardized  approach. 
This  can  also  provide  an  incentive  for  credit 
institutions to increase their use of internal ratings. 
More  specifically,  credit  institutions  should  be 
required to identify the proportion of assets under 
each exposure class for which external ratings by 
ECAIs  were  used  as  a  basis  for  investment 
decisions.  For  institutions  that  are  authorized  to 
make  partial  use  of  the  standardized  approach, 
additional  disclosure  requirements  on  the  risk 
exposures should also be made.  
 
If  implemented  correctly,  the  call  for  stricter 
requirement for due diligence should increase the 
costs  of  using  the  standardized  approach, 
effectively giving banks incentives to develop their 
own  models.  However,  as  seen  above,  the  IRB 
approach has attracted voluminous criticism of its 
own.  Thus,  we  call  for  a  more  coordinated  and 
stricter  validation  and  monitoring  of  the  internal 
risk models. It is only through a better alignment 
with  underlying  risks  that  the  risk  weights  can 
become  a  valuable  instrument  to  regulate  banks. 
The only way to achieve better alignment is if the 
internal  models  are  transparent,  well-defined, 
subject to public monitoring as well as validated by 
supervisors.  
 
To achieve these ends, banks should respond to a 
series  of  hypothetical  benchmark  portfolios  with 
varying risk levels that are provided by regulators, 
reporting various risk model parameters, including 
loss-given  default,  probability  of  default  and  the 
resulting risk-weights for various asset classes. The 
reporting  would  be  accomplished  both  for 
individual  exposure  classes  and  at  the  aggregate 
level  for  the  entire  portfolio.
16  Provided  that  the 
chosen  benchmarks  are  adequately  sophisticated, 
regulators will then be able to verify the adequacy 
and  coherence  of  the  internal  models  used  by 
individual  banks,  which  would  feed  into  the 
regular  supervisory  review  of  the  internal  risk 
systems.  Moreover,  the  results  from  the 
benchmarking  exercise  may  also  help  test  the 
validity  of  the  weight  assumptions  under  the 
standardized  approach.  Lastly,  the  public 
disclosure  of  the  results  (at  least  in  a  summary 
form) would also supplement market discipline by 
making risk preferences more transparent.  
Several key principles need to be considered in the 
design of the proposed measures. In particular, the 
internal model benchmarking exercises should: 
-  Be  regularly  updated,  allowing  external 
scrutiny;  
-  Be unannounced or should not allow banks a 
long preparation time; 
-  Distinguish  between  business  models  and 
account for likely model transitions;  
-  Provide banks with a number of hypothetical 
portfolios to avoid strategic reactions; 
-  Be  linked  to  the  supervisory  review  process, 
calling for add-ons if the internal models do not 
assess risks adequately; and 
-  Be  led  and  coordinated  by  the  EBA  in  close 
collaboration with the ESRB, possibly as part of 
stress testing exercises.   
One of the key challenges standing in the way of 
introducing  the  proposed  benchmark  exercise, 
however, is the potential administrative costs that 
it  would  impose  on  both  the  regulators  and  the 
banks. Leaving aside the intricacies of constructing 
appropriate  benchmarks  for  different  business 
models,  the  exercise  may  prove  demanding  and 
time-consuming, especially if regular on-site visits 
are required for verification. A cost-benefit analysis 
of the benchmarking exercise is worth pursuing. In 
                                                   
16  A  similar  approach  has  been  proposed  by  Vikram 
Pundit,  the  CEO  of  Citibank,  and  by  Jaime  Caurana, 
General  Manager  of  the  Bank  for  International 
Settlements  (BIS).  For  more  details,  see  “Apples  v 
apples: A new way to measure risk” by Vikram Pundit, 
Financial  Times,  10  January  2012  and  “The  need  for 
effective international collaboration in times of financial 
stress,” speech by Jaime Caruana, General Manager of 
the BIS, Berlin, 20 January 2012.  
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Europe, the EBA can start with a pilot sample of 
banks to which the stress tests have been applied.  
In  addition  to  the  benchmarking  exercise,  banks 
relying  on  the  IRB  approach  can  be  required  to 
publicly  disclose  the  risk-weighted  assets  and 
capital  charges  that  would  be  applicable  if  they 
were to use the standardized approach. Although 
this supplementary approach may suffer from the 
arbitrage  opportunities  mentioned  above,  the 
distinction  between  the  actual  and  benchmark 
results would nevertheless provide a rough proxy 
for the amount of capital ‘saved’ for the banks as 
well as the inherent riskiness of the model.  
Lastly,  the  regulators  should  not  use  the  risk 
weights as a political tool. Although doing so may 
put  fiscal  pressures  on  some  of  the  periphery 
countries,  such  as  Greece,  Italy,  Portugal  and 
Spain,  the  gradual  removal  of  the  ‘zero-risk 
weighting’  of  sovereign  debt  and  the 
harmonization  with  the  other  asset  classes  are 
necessary.17  Similarly,  the  unjustified  preferential 
treatment  of  other  exposures,  such  as  real  estate 
loans and SME credit, should be removed to bring 
the risk weights in line with the underlying risks.      
 
Overall,  the  EU  proposed  rules  fell  short  in 
addressing the fundamental flaws underlying the 
use of the RWA and subsequently the calculations 
of the minimum capital requirements, considered 
as the cornerstone of banking regulation.   
Leverage ratio  
One of the key features leading up to the crisis has 
been  the  excessive  build-up  of  leverage  in  the 
banking  sectors  of  many  advanced  countries, 
including the EU member states. As is the case for 
non-financial  firms,  leverage  is  used to  expand a 
firm’s assets through debt and making the most of 
                                                   
17 At the moment, there is little motivation to introduce 
an amendment of the “zero-risk weighting” of the EU 
sovereign  debt.  The  draft  report  of  the  European 
Parliament’s  Economics  and  Monetary  Affairs  of  16 
December 2011 Committee included an amendment to 
introduce  a  review  of  the  rule  by  the  European 
Commission,  “taking  into  account  potentially 
destabilizing  effects  of  tabling  such  proposals  during 
periods of stress”. The Danish Presidency compromise 
did not include such a revision or amend the rule.   
existing  capital.  Excessive  leverage  is  threatening 
because  even  a  small  downward  perturbation  in 
asset prices can wipe off an institution’s capital and 
lead  to  insolvency.  Moreover,  heavily  leveraged 
banks  tend  to  rely  on  less  stable  forms  of  short-
term debt to match the volatility of the valuation of 
their assets and minimizing their ‘surplus capital 
capacity’ (Adrian & Shin, 2010b). When economic 
conditions worsen, the leveraged institutions may 
fail  to  roll-over  their  debt  or  raise  additional 
capital, inducing them to de-leverage by selling off 
assets.  When  the  share  of  leveraged  firms  is 
relatively high, these conditions lead to a sudden 
drying up market liquidity, fire sales and further 
drops in asset prices (Geanakoplos, 2010; Acharya 
& Viswanathan, 2011).  
Faced with risk-sensitive regulatory requirements, 
many  banks  have  found  ways  to  become 
increasingly leveraged, leading to increased micro- 
and  macro-prudential  risks.  The  results  of  the 
study  show  substantial  differences  in  leverage 
across different business models (Figure 2).  
Figure 2. Leverage ratios across business models 
 
Notes:  The  leverage  ratio  is  defined  as  Tangible  Common 
Equity/(Total Assets - Intangible Assets), which is narrower 
than the CRD IV or Basel III definition based on Tier 1 capital. 
The  model  selection  and  clustering  procedures  used  to 
allocate banks into the different business models are described 
in Ayadi et al., (2012). 
Source: Ayadi et al. (2012). 
 
The  smaller  and  focused  retail  banks,  for  which 
customer loans and customer are clearly the main 
activities,  have  also  the  highest  leverage  ratio 
(implying  the  lowest  gearing  ratio).  In  turn, 
wholesale  banks,  for  which  inter-bank  liabilities 
account  for  approximately  a  quarter  of  total 
activities,  have  the  lowest  leverage  ratio.  This 
finding  most  likely  reflects  the  fact  that  the 
liquidity  risks  are  not  adequately  factored  in  the 
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current  regulations.  Albeit  improving  figures  in 
recent  years,  the  investment-oriented  banks  also 
have relatively low leverage ratios, possibly due to 
their  characteristically  high  derivative  activities, 
which can be used to reduce risk-weights. Lastly, 
the diversified retail banks, which are in between 
the  three  categories,  maintain  moderate  levels  of 
leverage, probably since their underlying model of 
extending customer loans does not allow them to 
grow as extensively as other banks.  
To the extent that these transactions are ‘cosmetic’, 
a leverage ratio may above all put a strict limit on 
the  total  amount  of  risks.  The  requirement  could 
also reinforce the regulator’s hand to sanction the 
banks  by  ensuring  that  the  banks  bear  a  larger 
proportion of the risks themselves (Blum, 2008).   
 
The leverage ratio is a useful tool to monitor and 
constrain  the  excessive  asset  growth.  From  an 
institutional  perspective,  it  can  be  used  to  assess 
adequacy  of  capital  in  relation  with  the  risk-
sensitive  requirements  and  relative  to  the  bank’s 
peers following the same business model. Perhaps 
more importantly, however, it can address macro-
prudential  concerns  by  restraining  the  self-
reinforcing boom-bust dynamics of leverage cycles.  
The Basel III framework introduced a new leverage 
ratio in an attempt to constrain the build up and to 
reinforce  the  existing  risk-based  capital 
requirements as a backstop measure. The proposed 
measure is defined as an institution’s Tier 1 capital 
divided  by  total  exposures  reported  as  an 
arithmetic  mean  of  monthly  averages  over  a 
quarter.  
Although a specific leverage ratio is not specified, 
the  proposal  mandates  EBA  to  determine  by 
October  2016  whether  a  3%  minimum  leverage 
ratio  is  appropriate.  Many  banks  have  already 
voiced concern that such a requirement would be 
too  costly  and  could  lead  to  substantial 
deleveraging.  As  is  the  case  for  capital 
requirements,  however,  it  appears  that  the 
suggested requirement can be met by most banks 
simply by retaining profits for as few as a couple of 
years. 
Figure  3.  Years  of  profit  retention  needed  to  meet 
alternative leverage ratio requirements 
 
Notes: Calculations are based on total shortfalls and profits for 
each  group,  averaged  over  the  years  2006  to  2010.  The 
leverage ratio is defined as Tangible Common Equity / (Total 
assets - Intangible Assets), which is narrower than the CRD IV 
or  Basel  III  definition  based  on  Tier  1  capital.  The  model 
selection and clustering procedures used to allocate banks into 
the different business models are described in Ayadi et al., 
(2012). 
More  specifically,  Figure  3  depicts  the  costs  of 
alternative  leverage  requirements  assuming  that 
the  needed  capital  will  be  raised  by  retaining 
profits. Although based on stricter definitions than 
the CRD IV-CRR proposal, most banks can meet a 
3%  minimum  leverage  ratio  requirement  by 
retaining profits for less than a single year. This is 
particularly  the  case  for  the  two  retail-oriented 
models, which need one and four month’s worth of 
profits  to  satisfy  the  requirements.  In  turn, 
investment and wholesale banks will need to retain 
profits  of  up  to  two  and  four  years  on  average, 
respectively.  On  average,  the  suggested 
requirement can be met by all banks in the sample 
by retaining profits of just over one year.  
Figure 3 also highlights that tougher requirements 
can also be met by withholding profits for several 
years. For example, a leverage ratio of 4% can be 
met by withholding approximately three years of 
profits for an average bank in our sample. While 
almost  all  retail  banks  can  satisfy  tougher 
requirements  by  retaining  two  years  of  profits, 
wholesale banks will need on average 8 years of 
profit retention, owing both to their high leverage 
ratios  and  low  profitability.  Investment  banks 
remain in between the two extremes. The figures 
also  show  that  the  costs  of  even  a  tougher  5% 
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minimum  requirement  would  be  substantial, 
implying an average bank to withhold profits for 
five years.  
Another  key  issue  relating  to  the  required 
minimums is the way that calculations are made. 
In  particular,  the  potential  impact  of  netting 
derivatives exposures could be substantial. This is 
particularly the case for investment banks, where 
derivative  transactions  represent  a  significant 
proportion of the balance sheets. For example, in 
the past few years, the derivative exposures have 
fluctuated between one-third and half of Deutsche 
Bank’s  total  activities.  However,  in  many  cases, 
derivative  transactions  enter  both  as  assets  and 
liabilities,  subject  to  various  forms  of  netting.  In 
Deutsche  Bank’s  case,  the  netting  arrangements 
that  are  applicable  under  the  US  GAAP  rules 
effectively reduce the total assets of Deutsche Bank 
by  one-quarter  to  one-third.18  Similar  netting 
arrangements may give rise to heterogeneity in the 
measurement of leverage ratio and undermine its 
effectiveness. A deeper look into such divergences 
may  be  warranted,  at  least  in  the  form  of  a 
technical guidance from EBA.  
As a second issue, and perhaps more crucially, the 
CRD  IV-CRR  proposal  sets  out  a  very  long 
transitory period for introducing a leverage ratio. 
Institutions are required to disclose their leverage 
ratios,  although  no  guidance  is  provided  for  a 
common  definition.  Aside  from  the  disclosure 
requirement,  the  tool  is  introduced  as  an 
“additional  feature  that  can  be  applied  on 
individual  institutions  at  the  discretion  of 
supervisory  authorities,”  and  “with  a  view  to 
migrating  to  a  binding  requirement”  only  after 
2018,  (Recital  68).  Indeed,  the  only  commitment 
made in the proposal regarding the leverage ratio 
is that a binding requirement will not be tabled for 
a  long  time,  if  at  all.  Although  the  amendments 
tabled by the Parliament mandate the introduction 
of a binding requirement by 2017, there is concern 
that the original proposal will not be changed.  
In addition, the current proposal leaves the details 
on the calculation methodology to be resolved by 
                                                   
18 Depending on whether the derivatives are netted-out 
(as under US GAAP) or not (as under IFRS), Deutsche 
Bank’s  leverage  ratios  for  the  year  2008  would  range 
between 3.6% and 1.0%, respectively. In later years, the 
distinction  became  smaller  due  to  Deutsche  Bank’s 
takeover of the more retail-oriented Postbank.  
the  EBA  by  October  2016,  which  could  put  the 
comparability of the disclosed figures in question.  
Therefore,  we  strongly  call  for  an  amendment  to 
introduce  a  binding  commitment  for  a  leverage 
ratio,  along  with  a  shorter  timetable  for  the 
introduction of the calculation methodology.  
 
Lastly,  an  important  question  is  the  level  of 
leverage  ratio  requirements.  Our  findings 
summarized above suggest that the 3% minimum 
requirement  would  be  serious  concern  for  the 
wholesale-  and  investment-oriented  banks. 
Naturally,  apart  from  the  business  models,  the 
appropriateness  of  the  requirements  depends 
crucially  on  the  definition  of  the  leverage  ratio. 
Thus,  EBA  should  review  whether  the suggested 
requirements under the Basel III framework would 
be sufficient to constrain the relevant risks in the 
EU, paying close attention to the risks arising from 
and costs to different business models.  
Counter-cyclical capital buffers 
Many  banks  faced  substantial  losses  during  the 
financial  crisis.  As  is  clear  from  the  protruded 
nature of the current crisis, these losses can lead to 
extensive  retrenching  of  credit  in  an  attempt  to 
comply with the capital requirements, leading to a 
downturn  in  the  real  economy,  with  future 
feedbacks into the banking sector. In essence, the 
time  invariant  nature  of  capital  requirements 
introduces pro-cyclicality by subjecting the banks 
to the same requirements throughout the business 
cycle.  
 
Several  studies  highlight  the  business-cycle 
amplification  effects  of  capital  requirements  and 
the  subsequent  ‘capital  crunches’  (Bernanke  & 
Lown, 1991; Peek & Rosengren, 1995; Kashyap & 
Stein,  2004;  Repullo  et  al.,  2009).  In  addition, 
Repullo & Salas (2011) warn that the procyclicality 
was  further  reinforced  by  the  entry  into  force  of 
Basel  II  through  the  calculation  of  risk-weights 
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and,  in  particular,  the  probability  of  default 
estimations. Counter-cyclical  buffers  would  offset 
these effects, requiring banks to hold more capital 
in  good  times  and  allowing  them  to shrink  their 
capital base in bad times. The capital buffers could 
also  serve  a  more  macro-prudential  function  in 
helping  prevent  the  excessive  build-up  risks 
through explosive growth of credit.  
Counter-cyclical  capital  buffers  have  been 
introduced  under  Basel  III  framework  to  ensure 
that banks build excess buffers that are above the 
regulatory  minimum.  The  proposed  Directive 
introduces  two  capital  buffers  beyond  the 
minimum  capital  requirements  to  minimize  the 
risk  of  violating  the  minimum  capital 
requirements. First, a capital conservation buffer of 
2.5%  of  the  risk-weighted  assets  (RWA)  is 
introduced. Institutions that fall below the buffer 
face  constraints  on  distributing  earnings;  the 
restrictions are applied in an increasing manner so 
that the closer the capital ratio is to the minimum 
requirement  the  greater  is  the  earnings 
conservation  requirements.  Second,  a 
countercyclical capital buffer is used to expand the 
capital conservation range (up to 2.5% of RWA) in 
good times to build up an added form absorption 
capacity. As is the case for the conservation buffer 
the  restrictions  on  earning  distributions  become 
more  apparent  as  the  capital  ratios  approach  the 
minimum required amounts.  
The  main  concern  regarding  the  capital  buffers 
relates to the method for setting the countercyclical 
buffer rate and the identification method to detect 
financial bubbles. Because of the macro-prudential 
nature of the task, this role must be granted to a 
macro-prudential  authority,  which  has  a  broad 
system view on the accumulation of risk at national 
and  regional  levels.  According  to  the  proposed 
rules,  each  member  state  will  designate  an 
authority for setting a reference guide based on the 
deviation of credit-to-GDP ratio from its long-term 
trend.  The  buffer  rate  is  to  be  revised  quarterly 
from  the  reference  guide  and  other  variables, 
including  possibly  structural  variables.  The 
potential  for  the  selection  of  distinct  structural 
variables  can  lead  to  undue  heterogeneity  in  the 
application  of  the  buffers  among  the  member 
states.  
 
It is also not entirely clear why structural variables, 
such as GDP growth, would be related to growing 
risk in the banking sector.19 The proposed counter-
cyclical  buffers  should  target  the  build-up  of 
financial risks, in the form of asset bubbles, and not 
necessarily  other  macroeconomic  risks.  Lastly, 
there  is  little  empirical  backing  on  the  selected 
methods and instruments for identifying financial 
bubbles.  In  particular,  a  detailed  analysis  by  the 
IMF  (2011b)  reveals  that  the  proposed  capital-to-
GDP gap is more likely than other measures to pick 
the wrong cycles (i.e. a ‘Type II error’) while failing 
to  pick  the  right  ones  (i.e.  a  ‘Type  I  error’).  We 
therefore  call  for  more  targeted  research  in  the 
selection  of  indicators  before  venturing  into 
poorly-designed  instruments,  which  would 
produce no value in detecting the accumulation of 
financial risks in the system and hence the future 
formation of financial bubbles.     
Liquidity requirements  
In various phases of the financial crisis in 2007-09, 
banks that relied extensively on short-term funding 
faced severe stresses due to the rapid reversal in 
the availability of global liquidity. In Europe, the 
risks  were  particularly  acute.  This  was  especially 
the  case  for  the  wholesale-oriented  banks  with 
substantial exposures, not only as a borrower but 
also as a lender, in the short-term debt, often raised 
in the interbank markets. For example, Royal Bank 
of  Scotland  (RBS),  Dexia  and  Hypo  Real,  with 
substantial  short-term  wholesale  funding 
exposures,  suffered  tremendously  during  the 
liquidity squeeze following the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers in September 2008. In all three cases, the 
banks had to be backed with extensive central bank 
liquidity and government support.  
                                                   
19  Although  GDP  growth  may  not  be  the  part  of  the 
indicator  to  identify  the  building  up  or  bursting  of 
bubbles,  it  may  nevertheless  have  an  indirect  impact 
through  other  variables,  most  notably  the  selected 
indicator. Maintaining this possibility, Repullo & Salas 
(2011)  show  that  the  proposed  measures  may  fail  to 
remove  the  pro-cyclicality  due  to  a  statistically 
significant  and  negative  correlation  between  credit-to-
GDP gap and GDP growth.  
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should  target  the  build-up  of  financial 
risks, in the form of asset bubbles, and not 
necessarily other macroeconomic risks. 12 | AYADI, ARBAK & DE GROEN 
 
The risks arising from excessive reliance on short-
term  funding  and  the  resulting  maturity 
mismatches,  roll-over  risks,  fire  sales,  and  the 
ultimate  drying  up  of  liquidity  have  long  been 
established  in  the  literature.  The  ability  of 
depositors  to  withdraw  their  money  collectively 
exposes  banks  to  potential  self-fulfilling  panics 
(Diamond  &  Dybvig,  1983).  In  response,  many 
regulators  in  many  countries  have  introduced 
deposit insurance schemes to mitigate such risks, 
effectively rebranding customer deposits as a safer 
form  of  funding.  In  the  interbank  and  money 
markets,  it  has  long  been  noticed  that  the 
uninsured  and  often  uncollateralized  mutual 
exposures  can  lead  to  a  rapid  amplification  of 
contagion  risks  (Rochet  &  Tirole,  1996).  More 
recently, the reinforcing nature of funding liquidity 
(i.e.  the  ability  to  obtain  funding)  and  market 
liquidity (i.e. ability to sell assets) have been shown 
as the principle source of the sudden drying up of 
liquidity  and  flight  to  quality  observed  in  early 
phases  of  the  crisis  (Brunnermeier,  2009; 
Brunnermeier & Pedersen, 2009).  
 
An interesting question is why short-term funding 
has  become  so  predominant  in  recent  years.  The 
simple answer is that more stable funding sources, 
such as customer deposits, can help a bank grow 
up until a point. For many banks, expanding the 
balance sheets is only possible by relying more on 
short-term  funding,  implying  greater  liquidity 
risks. In addition, this type of funding also allows 
banks to manage their balance sheet sizes actively 
in  a  highly  pro-cyclical  manner  (Adrian  &  Shin, 
2008; 2010b). Although short-term funding allows 
banks to grow, it may also generate self-reinforcing 
liquidity shortages, as materialized during crisis.  
Liquidity  standards  are  among  the  key  concepts 
introduced  in  the  Basel  III  framework.  BCBS 
proposed two measures to reinforce the resilience 
of banks to liquidity risks (BCBS, 2010c).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. NSFR across business models 
 
Notes: The assumptions for construction the net stable funding 
ratio (NSFR) are similar to those put forward in IMF (2011a), 
to the extent of data availability. See Ayadi et al. (forthcoming) 
for details on the assumptions. The sample of banks includes 
74 of EU’s biggest banks in terms of asset size. The model 
selection and clustering procedures used to allocate banks into 
the different business models are described in Ayadi et al., 
(2011). 
Source: Ayadi et al. (2012). 
The  LCR  requirement  specifies  that  the  value  of 
qualifying liquid assets should be at least sufficient 
to  cover  anticipated net  outflows  during  30  days 
under stress conditions. Banks should meet these 
standards  continuously  and  hold  unencumbered 
(i.e. non-pledged)20 liquid assets to serve as a buffer 
against severe liquidity outflows. Under Basel III 
parlance, high quality liquid unencumbered assets 
should “be easily and immediately converted into 
cash at little or no loss of value” even in times of 
stress (BCBS, 2010c, p. 5). Net total outflows, on the 
other hand, are comprised of total outflows, which 
include  less  stable  funding  sources  such  as 
potential  draw-downs  on  committed  credit  or 
liquidity  facilities,  minus  potential  inflows,  such 
planned inflows from performing loans.  
The second measure, the Net Stable Funding Ratio 
(NSFR),  considers  a  one-year  horizon  to  ensure 
                                                   
20 A review by UK Financial Services Authority revealed 
that RBS had a LCR of between 18% and 32% at the end 
of  August  2008.  The  shortage  of  high-quality 
unencumbered  liquid  assets  at  the  same  date  was 
estimated to be between £125bn and £166bn. For more 
details,  see  FSA  (2011),  The failure  of  the  Royal  Bank of 
Scotland,  Financial  Services  Authority  Board  Report, 
December  2011 
(http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/other_publications/m
iscellaneous/2011/rbs.shtml).  
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that  the  (on-  and  off-balance  sheet)  maturity 
mismatches  between  an  institution’s  assets  and 
liabilities are not too excessive. Although the CRD 
IV contains few details, the standard developed by 
BCBS requires that the amount of available stable 
funding sources  must  be  at  least  as much  as  the 
required stable funding (BCBS, 2010, p. 25).21 
The  evolution  of  the  available  stable  funding 
sources as a share of required funding for the top 
EU  banks  is  depicted  in  Figure  3.  Retail  banks 
clearly  have  more stable  funding sources,  due  to 
their heavy reliance on customer deposits. In turn, 
wholesale  and  especially  investment  banks  are 
exceptionally  illiquid,  explained  by  their  reliance 
on  trading  assets  and  derivative  transactions, 
respectively.  With  the  clear  exception  of  the 
universal  banks,  all  business  models  faced 
worsening  liquidity  conditions  during  the  crisis, 
due  largely  to  absorbed  losses.  Interestingly,  no 
single  model  satisfies  the  100%  funding 
requirement on average, as proposed under Basel 
III. 
 
A  common  weakness  is  that  the  introduced 
liquidity measures continue to treat EU sovereign 
exposures as highly liquid. Under the CRD IV-CRR 
proposal,  exposures  to  transferable  claims  issued 
or explicitly backed by member states are deemed 
highly  liquid,  without  looking  at  the quality  and 
the  actual  liquidity  conditions  for  those  assets.22 
Under the general criterion proposed under CRD 
IV-CRR, the lower trading volumes, credit ratings, 
as  well  as  higher  bid/ask  spreads  applicable  to 
certain  sovereign  bonds  would  qualify  them  as 
being illiquid. As in the case of zero risk-weighting 
of  EU  sovereign  debt,  the  preferential  treatment 
afforded  to  sovereign  debt  could  be  troublesome 
and  undermine  the  timely  identification  of 
                                                   
21  More  specifically,  available  stable  funding  sources 
include  capital  and  reserves,  customer  deposits  and 
other  liabilities  with  more  than  one-year  maturities. 
Required stable funding includes assets that cannot be 
quickly  sold  off  without  substantial  costs  during 
adverse market conditions lasting up to one year. 
22 For third countries, the exposures can also be treated 
as being liquid to the extent that they are held to cover 
currency risks.  
liquidity  risks,  especially  for  banks  with  high 
public sector exposures.23  
Second, the proposed liquidity measures may have 
an  important  impact  on  conduct  of  monetary 
policy.  In  particular,  LCR  gives  a  preferential 
treatment  to  central  bank  excess  reserves  and 
liquidity.24  These  treatments  in  turn  are  likely  to 
enhance  the  role  of  the  central  banks  as  an 
intermediary in the provision of liquidity even in 
normal times, crowding-out the wholesale funding 
markets,  undermining  the  incentives  of  market 
participants to monitor the borrowing banks, and 
making  the  exit  from  current  liquidity  support 
measures more difficult. Moreover, if the definition 
of liquid assets under the LCR fails to overlap with 
the  criteria  for  central  bank  liquidity  eligibility, 
banks  may  engage  in  a  regulatory  arbitrage  by 
pledging  more  risky  assets  as  collateral  at  the 
central  bank  and  keeping  the  more  liquid  ones 
unencumbered.25  Therefore,  the  design  of  the 
                                                   
23 Indeed, the proposed measures would have failed to 
pick  the  growing  liquidity  problems  in  Dexia 
(rebranded as Belfius in February 2012). Prior to 2011, 
the  bank’s  exposures  to  marketable  public  debt 
instruments,  mostly  issued  or  backed  by  the  Belgian, 
French, Greek, and Italian governments, accounted for 
approximately  20  to  25%  of  the  bank’s  balance  sheet. 
Due  to  a  severe  drop  in  the  market  prices  of  EU 
sovereign  debt  in  2011,  these  exposures  heralded  the 
market liquidity problems and necessitated an ultimate 
bail-out by Belgium, France and Luxembourg. Neither 
the LCR nor the NSFR (detailed under Basel III) would 
reveal the liquidity troubles early on since the exposures 
would be deemed as highly liquid, at least up until the 
point that they were pledged as collateral for obtaining 
central bank liquidity, which occurred in the second half 
of 2011. 
24  In  particular,  cash  and  deposits  held  at  the  central 
bank will be reported as being liquid assets under the 
CRD IV proposal (CRR, Art. 404(1)a). These exposures 
are also likely to qualify for the highest quality liquidity 
once  the  EBA  issues  its  review  on  the  detailed 
definitions.  In  addition,  under  Basel  III,  funding  from 
the  central  bank  in  the  form  of  secured  repurchase 
agreement operations collateralized by less liquid assets 
also receive a more preferential treatment.  
25 Similar points are raised by Lorenzo Bini Smaghi, then 
a  member  of  the  Executive  Board  of  the  European 
Central Bank, at the International Banking Conference 
“Matching  Stability  and  Performance:  the  Impact  of 
New  Regulations  on  Financial  Intermediary 
Management”,  Milan,  29  September  2010.  See 
http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2010/html/sp100
929.en.html.  
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liquidity measures should consider their impact on 
monetary  policy,  especially  through  the  ‘risk-
taking’ channel (Borio & Zhu, 2008; Adrian & Shin, 
2010a).  
 
Third,  LCR  fails  to  capture  the  broader  liquidity 
risks due to a wealth of reasons. To a large extent, 
the  assessment  of  the  liquidity  of  various  asset 
classes, which will be subject to a review by EBA to 
be  conducted  by  end-2013,  rely  extensively  on 
historical  trade-based  proxies,  such  as  minimum 
traded  volume  and  maximum  bid/ask  spread. 
Moreover, liquidity is by definition an endogenous 
concept;  during  a  market  tumble,  assets  once 
deemed liquid can quickly become illiquid due to 
concentration risks. Since the short-term liquidity 
concept  has  to  distinguish  more  specific  about 
asset  classes,  endogeneity  creates  the  possibility 
that  the  LCR  can  be  erroneous,  not  adequately 
highlighting risks due to static model assumptions.   
Fourth, the CRD IV-CRR proposal fails to commit 
to  table  a  binding  NSFR  requirement  beyond  a 
basic disclosure standard, much like the leverage 
ratio.  Indeed,  similar  to  the  leverage  ratio 
requirements,  the  proposal  only  makes  a 
commitment  not  to  table  a  binding  NSFR 
requirement until 2018. NSFR is a broader concept 
and is less reliant on individual asset classes. For 
that reason, it is less likely to be incorrect. We thus 
argue that the long-term liquidity measure should 
be a part of the regulatory framework, precisely as 
foreseen  under  the  Basel  III  framework.  A  more 
ambitious commitment for its adoption by 2015 is 
therefore essential. 
Reporting and disclosure requirements 
One of the key lessons from the 2011 CEPS study 
was  that  the  transparency  and  public  disclosure 
practices of different business models were by and 
large incomplete. Although some banks appear to 
report more information than others, there appears 
to  be  discrepancies,  even  for  a  given  bank  over 
time. Apart from a handful of general terms, such 
as  total  assets,  a  comparison  across  banks  is 
rendered extremely hard due to a general lack of 
standards  on  the  reported  items.  Comparable 
information on some of the most basic items, such 
as  risk  exposures  and  liquidity  conditions,  is not 
available  in  many  cases.  These  incongruities  are 
likely  to  grow  as  the  reporting  and  regulatory 
requirements become more numbered over time, as 
foreseen in the CRD IV-CRR after the observation 
phases of various elements.  
 
An  additional  issue  is  the  public  availability  of 
quarterly  reports.  While  in  the  US,  quarterly 
individual  disclosures  of  all  licensed  commercial 
banks  (listed  or  unlisted)  obtained  from  the 
Reports of Condition and Income (“Call Report”) 
are  made  public  in  bulk26,  in  the  EU  no  such 
practice exists. These micro-data sets are extremely 
useful  for  researchers  and  investors  that  are 
attempting  to  assess  and  compare  key  variables 
relating  to  banks’  structures,  performances, 
stability, and profitability and most importantly to 
examine changing business models. These reports 
are  required  to  be  submitted  by  all  regulated 
financial institutions and collected by the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Since 2005, 
the  reporting  has  been  done  in  the  extensible 
business  reporting  language  (XBRL),  which  is  an 
open-source  global  standard  for  exchanging 
business  information.  In  the  EU,  the  supervisory 
reporting  frameworks  for  financial  reporting 
(FINREP)  and  common  reporting  (COREP)  have 
been  developed,  currently  based  on  non-binding 
guidelines and reporting, both based on XBRL.   
The  proposed  Regulation  can  benefit  from  an 
amendment  to  clarify  the  various  reporting 
frameworks,  starting  with  a  standardized  set  of 
items  to  be  reported,  under  technical  guidance 
from EBA. In addition, putting clear legal basis and 
deadlines  for  all  credit  institutions  to  start 
reporting  using  the  COREP/FINREP  frameworks 
and  shift  to  the  use  of  the  XBRL-type  reporting 
across  the  EU  could  also  be  beneficial.  To  that 
extent,  the  standardized  set  of  items  to  report 
should  be  seen  as  a  first  step  for  a  more 
harmonious  reporting  foreseen  under  the 
frameworks.  Moreover,  the  quarterly  balance 
                                                   
26 See http://www.chicagofed.org/webpages/banking/ 
financial_institution_reports/commercial_bank_data.cf
m. A timelier updated site also exists at FFIEC Central 
Data Repository's Public Data Distribution site (PDD), 
https://cdr.ffiec.gov/public/.  
Comparable  information  on  some  of  the 
most basic items is not available in many 
cases. 
LCR fails to capture the broader liquidity 
risks  and the  proposal  fails  to  commit  to 
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sheet,  income  statement,  and  liquidity  conditions 
on  all  banks,  listed  or  unlisted,  should  be  made 
available  from  a  central  public  website,  free  of 
charge, much like in the US.   
Conclusions 
Implementing the international Basel III standards 
into EU law, the CRD IV-CRR proposal is certainly 
a  game  changer  for  many  banks,  regulators  and 
market  participants.  However,  an  assessment 
reveals  that  the  proposed  rules  are  not  as 
ambitious as they claim to be.  
In  particular,  the  proposal  fails  to  make  a 
commitment to introduce binding requirements on 
leverage ratio or the closely linked concept of net 
stable  funding  ratio  (NSFR).  The  literature  and 
recent evidence show that both tools can play a key 
role  in  mitigating  systemic  risks,  restraining 
excessive  growth  and  more  generally  the  self-
reinforcing dynamics of boom-bust cycles. Without 
a clear commitment, the regulators and legislators 
will  miss  an  opportunity  to  address  one  of  the 
important lessons learnt from the crisis, i.e. the lack 
of an EU-wide macro-prudential approach.  
As a second line of criticism, the proposal, much 
like  the  Basel  III  framework,  continues  to  rely 
excessively  on  the  risk-sensitive  approach.  The 
present  evidence  and  theoretical  literature  shows 
that the risk-weighted asset measure can only be a 
poor indicator of underlying risks that banks take. 
To the extent that the misalignment is caused by 
the  freedom  that  banks  enjoy  in  optimizing  their 
capital,  a  more  coordinated  validation  and 
monitoring of banks’ internal risk models, possibly 
through  a  benchmarking  exercise,  is  needed. 
Furthermore,  the  introduction  of  a  binding 
leverage ratio will also reduce the reliance on risk-
sensitive capital requirements.  
Third,  the  European  Banking  Authority  (EBA) 
should  have  a  more  important  role  than  a 
bookkeeper for EU-wide definitions and guideline. 
If national authorities continue to practice undue 
discretionary powers or challenge EBA, the current 
weaknesses  may  persist  or  even  worsen.  This  is 
particularly  the  case  for  key  areas,  such  as  the 
definition  of  instruments  that  are  eligible  for 
regulatory purposes, the definition of liquid assets, 
and so forth. The authority should be armed with 
adequate  powers  to  reach  its  primary  aim  of 
safeguarding the stability of EU’s banking system. 
Fourth,  and  in  a  related  manner,  the  politically-
oriented provisions should be gradually removed. 
The criticism is particularly applicable for the zero-
risk weighting of EU sovereign debt risks, which 
induces an optimistic view of credit and liquidity 
risks. Similarly, the highly preferential treatment of 
real estate exposures (or SME loans as suggested 
under  some  amending  versions)  can  lead  to  an 
asset bubble in those areas, paving the way for the 
next crisis. Similarly, the regulators and legislators 
should  not  yield  to  excessive  lobbying  from  the 
industry, which in most likelihood contributed to a 
less ambitious proposal.  
Fifth,  the  proposal  makes  no  attempt  to 
substantially  improve  disclosure  standards. 
Comparable information on some of the most basic 
bank-related  items,  such  as  risk  exposures  and 
liquidity  conditions,  is  currently  lacking. 
Disclosure standards are likely to improve a more 
detailed and accurate private monitoring, which is 
supposed  to  be  a  key  aspect  of  the  Pillar  3 
requirements.  
Lastly, our study (Ayadi et al., 2012) highlights the 
relevance  of  varying  risks  reflected  by  different 
business  models.  Most  concretely,  the  wholesale- 
and investment-oriented banks in the EU appear to 
have the lowest leverage ratios among their peers, 
well below the 3% leverage ratio suggested under 
Basel III. As for the appropriate minimum capital 
requirements,  both  the  focused  retail-  and 
wholesale-oriented models suffer from substantial 
tail shocks. Moreover, some of the policy initiatives 
suggested here, such as the benchmarking exercise, 
clearly highlight a need to a better understanding 
of  the  business  models  and  their  evolutions.  For 
these  reasons,  more  policy-oriented  research  and 
monitoring  is  necessary  to  better  align  the 
regulatory  initiatives  with  the  inherent  risks  of 
different models.  
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Annex 1. Topics under Discussion in the ‘Trialogue’ over CRD IV-CRR 
Policy area 
CRD IV-CRR 
European Commission  European Parliament  European Council 
Capital requirements       
Capital buffers   Capital conservation buffer of up to 
2.5% and countercyclical capital buffer 
of up to 2.5% (CRDIV Article 123 and 
130).  
Introduction of a systemic risk buffer on top 
of the capital conservation buffer and 
countercyclical capital buffer. The systemic 
risk buffer increases the capital requirement 
by 1 to 10% for both global and domestic 
systemic institutions (European Parliament 
compromises AK and AL on CRD IV). 
Introduction of a systemic risk buffer on 
top of the capital conservation buffer and 
countercyclical capital buffer. National 
authorities can increase the requirement 
by up to 3% with a notification. Between 3 
and up to 5% approval of the European 
Commission is required (Council 
compromise on CRD IV Article 124a). 
Risk weighted assets  The risk-weights for SME exposures of 
75% (CRR Article 118). 
The risk-weights for SME exposures are 
dropped to 50% (European Parliament 
compromise on CRR Article 118). 
The risk-weights for SME exposures 
remain 75% (Council compromise on CRR 
Article 118). 
Large exposures to SMEs  Maximum single exposure to a SME of 
€1 million (CRR Article 118).  
Maximum single exposure to a SME of €2 
millions (European Parliament compromise 
on CRR Article 118). 
Maximum single exposure to a SME 
remains €1 million (Council compromise 
on CRR Article 118). 
Leverage ratio       
Threshold  Suggesting leverage ratio of 3% (CRR 
Article 482). 
 
Possibly allowing for divergence in leverage 
ratio based on riskiness of business model. 
Suggesting leverage ratios between 1.5-5% 
(European Parliament compromise on CRR 
Article 482). 
Suggesting leverage ratio of 3% (Council 
compromise on CRR Article 482) 
 
Off-balance sheet exposures  Risk weight of 10% for ‘low risk’ 
exposures and 100% for other off-
balance sheet exposures (CRR Article 
416). 
Introduction of lower weight for ‘medium 
risk’ off-balance sheet exposures 20-50% 
(European Parliament compromise on CRR 
Article 416). 
Introduction of lower weight for ‘medium 
risk’ off-balance sheet exposures 20-50% 
(Council compromise on CRR Article 
416). 
Timetable  Disclosure from 2015 onwards. The 
ratio might mitigate into a binding 
leverage ratio from 2018 onwards (CRR 
Article 482). 
Disclosure from 2015 onwards. The 
European Commission shall, adopt by July 
2017 a delegated act on the introduction of a 
binding leverage ratio (European Parliament 
compromise on CRR Article 482). 
Disclosure from 2015 onwards; The ratio 
might mitigate into a binding leverage 
ratio from 2018 onwards (Council 
compromise on CRR Article 482). IMPLEMENTING BASEL III IN EUROPE | 19 
 
Policy area 
CRD IV-CRR 
European Commission  European Parliament  European Council 
Liquidity coverage 
requirement (LCR) 
     
Timetable  Disclosure from 2015 onwards. 
Suggesting binding liquidity coverage 
ratio from 2018 onwards (CRR Article 
481). 
Disclosure from 2015 onwards. Suggesting 
binding liquidity coverage ratio from 2018 
onwards (European Parliament compromise 
on CRR Article 481). 
Disclosure from 2015 onwards. 
Suggesting binding liquidity coverage 
ratio from 2018 onwards (Council 
compromise on CRR Article 481). 
Liquid assets  At least 60% of the liquid assets should 
be ‘highly liquid’ (CRR Article 405).  
At least 40% of the liquid assets should be 
‘highly liquid’ (European Parliament 
compromise on CRR Article 405). 
No minimum for highly liquid assets 
(Council compromise on CRR Article 
405). 
Net Stable Funding Ratio 
(NSFR) 
     
Timetable  The European Commission will 
consider proposing a stable funding 
ratio after an observation and review 
period in 2018. 
By 31 December 2016, the European 
Commission shall adopt a delegated act 
setting out the requirements for a Net Stable 
Funding Ratio.  
The European Commission will consider 
proposing a stable funding ratio after an 
observation and review period in 2018. 
Compensation    The variable payment of bank employees 
may not exceed the fixed pay (European 
Parliament compromise on CRDIV Article 
90). 
 
Other    On shadow banking, securities- and repo 
lending as well as the top ten exposures to 
unregulated financial entities need to be 
disclosed. In addition, it proposes to 
maximise the exposures to unregulated 
financial entities to 25% or €150 million 
(European Parliament compromises on 
Articles 483 and 484). 
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